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The great powers remain the primary actors in international relations in the 
modern world. This is proved by the continuous competition between them for 
spheres of influence. The great powers possess political and diplomatic, as well 
as military and economic strength which may cause the rest of the world to 
take into consideration their interests. This is also true in the case of Ukraine 
when the crisis of 2013-2014 brought the world to the edge of a new Cold War. 
On the one hand, Ukraine has an important geopolitical position which gives 
it the opportunity to maneuver, but on the other, Ukraine has to consider the 
great powers’ opinions before taking action of its own. It is in Russia’s interest 
to maintain Ukraine within its sphere of its influence – political, economic and 
cultural. The European Union, however, is tending to gradually attract Ukraine 
into its structure through the creation of a political association and free trade 
area.
In the book Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, the author Richard 
Sakwa examines the causes of present crisis in Ukraine which is centered on 
the disputed territory of Crimea and the eastern regions of Donbass. Richard 
Sakwa is Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of 
Kent, United Kingdom. He writes books about Russian and Eastern European 
communist and post-communist politics. He is also the author of The Rise and 
Fall of the Soviet Union (1999), Putin: Russia’s Choice (2007), and Russian 
Politics and Society (2008). In his most recent book, he follows the origins, 
developments and significance of the conflict from the protests in Kiev until 
the parliamentary elections of October 2014. He describes the conflict as the 
result of two interacting processes: an internal conflict over the nature of the 
Ukrainian state, and an external contest for influence over its future.
1  Volodymyr Solovey is a Ph.D. student at the Sociology Doctoral School at the Corvinus University 
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In the introduction and first chapter the author provides a brief background 
to the Ukrainian crisis and important moments from its history. He indicates 
that for centuries Ukraine has always been a source of rivalry between strong 
neighbors who competed for its land. And that in the modern era, the country 
has enjoyed only a brief period of statehood following the collapse of Russian 
empire in 1917. According to many Russians, Ukraine and Russia are just two 
components of a single civilization, Ukrainians, though, argue that their country 
long ago set out on its own path of development. Based on these opinions the 
author shows that there are two models of Ukrainian statehood, and ultimately 
the Ukrainian crisis (2013-2014) represented a battle between the two. The first 
model is driven by the idea of Ukraine as a nation state, officially monolingual, 
culturally autonomous from Russia, aligned with Europe and the Atlantic 
community. The second is the idea of Ukraine as state nation, an assemblage 
of different traditions, where Russian is recognized as a second language and 
economic, social and cultural links with Russia are maintained.
In the next chapters the author analyzes the international context of the 
Ukrainian crisis with the help of the concept of “Two Europes” (Chapter 2); 
namely, “the Wider” and “the Greater”. He believes that the first, based on the 
model of Western democracy, is expanding eastwards, assisted by NATO, and 
has an anti-Russian orientation. The second entails a concept of Europe that 
stretches “from Lisbon to Vladivostok”, the “common European home” that 
was defined by Charles de Gaulle and Mikhail Gorbachev during their times. 
He defends the second version (that is, the “continental” concept of Europe) 
and criticizes wider Europe. Sakwa states that the conflicts in the post-Soviet 
space should be explained by the aggressive expansion of the Western model 
eastwards which culminated in the Ukrainian crisis.
The author shows that the European Union’s attempts to draw Ukraine into 
its orbit were instrumental in tipping the country into conflict. He stresses that 
the misguided policies of the European Union and its inability to take decisions 
about European affairs independently of the United States are the key reasons 
that the crisis in Ukraine remains unresolved. Therefore, in his opinion, steps 
towards further development of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) – intended 
to absorb former soviet countries in the borderlands between the EU and Russia 
– were counterproductive. He indicates that nowhere was this dilemma felt 
more than in Ukraine. The other post-soviet countries are also potential conflict 
hotspots.
The author indicates that the Ukrainian crisis cannot be understood unless 
the evolution of Russian thinking is analyzed. He cites publications by Russian 
writers such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn who advocated for the creation of a 
Russian union with Ukraine as its heart. Solzhenitsyn wrote that “Ukraine 
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matters to Russia as an issue of survival, quite apart from a thousand years of 
shared history and civilization.” (p.75)
Despite the many interesting facts, the author presents a one-sided interpretation 
of Russian politics which contains contradictory arguments. On the one hand, 
he argues that Europe has become “hostage to a faraway country” (i.e. Ukraine). 
But on the other hand, he defends the concept of “the Greater Europe” (the idea 
of an extended Europe which includes Russia). The author identifies Eastern 
European countries as being responsible for anti-Russian sanctions. He favors 
Russian foreign policy and argues that Russia under Vladimir Putin is not a 
land-grabbing state but a conservative power whose activities are designed to 
maintain the status quo. In his opinion, Russia is constantly defending itself 
against an offensive West, and the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 was 
in effect the first of the wars intended to stop NATO enlargement, while the 
Ukrainian crisis of 2014 was the second.
As for the Russian annexation of the Crimea, the author’s attitude is 
characterized by understanding and attempts at justification. In his opinion, 
Russia was forced into both the annexation of Crimea and opposition to the 
Kiev government due to perceived aggression and threatening behavior on the 
part of NATO, the EU and Ukraine. The author leaves out reference to the role of 
Russia and the action it played in escalating the conflict in Ukraine. In particular, 
he ignores the impact of Vladimir Putin’s presidency and the subsequent 
dramatic weakening of Russian opposition, civil society and the media. The 
more authoritarian approach of the Russian political elite has contributed to the 
country’s aggressive reaction to events in Ukraine. How the West and Ukraine 
have failed to handle the crisis is the key focus of the book.
To sum up, in the book Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands the 
author Richard Sakwa goes into the history and society, as well as the domestic 
and foreign policy, of Ukraine.  He describes the Ukrainian crisis as a complex 
problem which did not develop out of nowhere. He points out that it originated 
in a geopolitical contest, critical problems with administration, corruption, 
and a weak democracy, as well as in the country’s cultural, regional and 
ethnic diversity. In his opinion, this led to regime change in Kiev, the Russian 
annexation of Crimea, and the armed conflict in the region of Donbass.
The book contains many valuable facts and reflections about current 
Ukrainian-Russian relations, but lacks a significant degree of objectivity. It 
largely places the blame for the conflict on the countries of the West and Ukraine 
itself, while Russia’s role is justified and rationalized. However, the book can be 
recommended to social scientists, as well as anyone else who is interested in 
reading about Ukrainian-Russian relations and the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-
2014.
